Wedges: Distribution, Distortions, and Market Integration
Giuseppe Bertola
No 11980, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Abstract:
This paper proposes a stylized model of policy determination and imperfect international integration. A policy wedge aims to correct laissez-faire market imperfections and/or redistribute welfare across heterogeneous agents. Policy is subject to both race-to-the-bottom and beggar-thy-neighbor forces if the country's politico-economic equilibrium interacts with the rest of the world. Variation of international market wedges induces patterns of country-specific regulation and deregulation that depend on political and structural features in non-obvious, intuitive, and empirically realistic ways.
Keywords: Policy competition; Capital mobility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D33 F02 J08 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-04
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP11980 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org
Related works:
Journal Article: Wedges: Distribution, distortions, and market integration (2019) 
Working Paper: Wedges: Distribution, Distortions, and Market Integration (2017) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11980
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP11980
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().