Journal Competition and the Quality of Published Research: Simultaneous versus Sequential Screening

Thomas Gehrig and Rune Stenbacka

No 12065, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We explore how the nature of the screening technology and the organization of the submission system affect the screening incentives of competing journals. Total screening in a duopolistic journal industry exceeds that of a monopoly. Exclusivity requirements for submissions induce more screening than systems with parallel submission. Interestingly, in the sequential screening model established journal rankings tend to reduce screening incentives. The screening technology determines whether the high-ranked or low-ranked journal have stronger screening incentives, which has implications for the long-run stability of established rankings.

Keywords: Simultaneous versus sequential screening; Information acquisition; Assessment of research quality; Competition between journals (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D80 L10 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-dcm and nep-mic
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Journal Article: Journal competition and the quality of published research: Simultaneous versus sequential screening (2021)
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