Monetary Neutrality with Sticky Prices and Free Entry

Florin Bilbiie

No 12068, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Monetary policy is neutral even with fixed prices, if there is free entry and variety is determined optimally as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). When individual prices are sticky, entry substitutes for price flexibility in the welfare-based price index. In response to aggregate demand expansions, the intensive (quantity produced of each good) and extensive (number of goods being produced) margins move in offsetting ways, leaving aggregate production unchanged. Deviations from neutrality thus occur only when variety is not optimally determined (preferences are not Dixit-Stiglitz) or when entry is subject to frictions.

Keywords: Monetary policy; Neutrality; Sticky prices; Entry; Product variety; Monopolistic competition; Dixit-stiglitz; Sunk costs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D42 E52 E58 L16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mac and nep-mon
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