EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Eradicating Women-Hurting Customs: What Role for Social Engineering?

Emmanuelle Auriol (), Giula Camilotti and Jean-Philippe Platteau

No 12107, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Social engineering refers to deliberate attempts, often under the form of legislative moves, to promote changes in customs and norms that hurt the interests of marginalized population groups. This paper explores the analytical conditions under which social engineering is more or less likely to succeed than more indirect approaches when it comes to suppress gender-biased customs. This implies discussing the main possible interaction frameworks leading to anti-women equilibria, and deriving policy implications from the corresponding games. The theoretical arguments are illustrated by examples drawn from available empirical works, thus providing a reasoned survey of the literature.

Keywords: coordination incentives; deterrence; expressive function of law; Gender; harmful customs; Social norms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D10 K10 K36 O15 Z10 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-soc
Date: 2017-06
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=12107 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
Working Paper: Eradicating women-hurting customs: What role for social engineering? (2017) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12107

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.cepr.org/ ... rs/dp.php?dpno=12107

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().

 
Page updated 2019-06-06
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12107