The Inner Workings of the Board: Evidence from Emerging Markets

Daniel Ferreira, Ralph De Haas and Tom Kirchmaier ()

No 12317, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We survey non-executive directors in emerging markets to obtain detailed information about the inner workings of corporate boards across a variety of institutional settings. We document substantial variation in the structure and conduct of boards as well as in directors’ perceptions about the local legal environment. Further analysis indicates that directors who feel adequately empowered by local legislation are less likely to actively vote against board proposals. They also form boards that play a stronger role in the company’s strategic decision-making. This suggests that a supportive legal environment allows directors to focus more on their advisory, as opposed to their monitoring, role.

Keywords: Boards of directors; Corporate governance; Emerging markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 G38 K22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-law
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Related works:
Journal Article: The inner workings of the board: Evidence from emerging markets (2021)
Working Paper: The inner workings of the board: evidence from emerging markets (2020)
Working Paper: The Inner Working of the Board: Evidence from the Emerging Markets (2017)
Working Paper: The Inner Working of the Board: Evidence from the Emerging Markets (2017)
Working Paper: The Inner Working of the Board: Evidence from the Emerging Markets (2017)
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