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The Externalities of Corruption: Evidence from Entrepreneurial Activity in China

Mariassunta Giannetti, Guanmin Liao (), Jiaxing You and Xiaoyun Yu

No 12345, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We show that corruption affects negatively the performance of small entrepreneurial firms, which compete with corrupted industry peers. We exploit the Chinese anti-corruption campaign to establish causality and identify the channels through which corruption causes negative externalities. Small firms have lower sales growth in industries with high corruption, arguably because demand is diverted to the largest firms in their industries, which spend more in corrupting officials. Small firms also have higher financing costs in industries with high corruption and therefore invest less. Furthermore, corruption decreases the efficiency of labor and capital allocation and deters firm entry.

Keywords: capital and labor allocation; China; corporate governance; Corruption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D22 D62 G30 L20 O12 P26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cse, nep-ent, nep-sbm and nep-tra
Date: 2017-10
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