Climate Risk, Cooperation, and the Co-Evolution of Culture and Institutions

Ruben Durante and Johannes Buggle

No 12380, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between economic risk and the evolution of social cooperation. We hypothesize that trust developed in pre-industrial times as a result of experiences of cooperation aimed at coping with climatic risk. We document that European regions with higher pre-industrial climatic variability display higher levels of trust today. This effect is driven by variability in the growing season months and is more pronounced in agricultural regions. Regarding possible mechanisms, our results indicate that climatic risk favored inter-community exchange and the early adoption of inclusive political institutions which is associated with higher quality of local governments today.

Keywords: climate; Trust; Cooperation; Political institutions; Persistence; Risk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: N53 O11 O13 Q54 Z10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-env, nep-evo, nep-gro, nep-his, nep-pol and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (52)

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Journal Article: Climate Risk, Cooperation and the Co-Evolution of Culture and Institutions (2021)
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