Equilibrium Currency Crises: Are Multiple Equilibria Self-fulfilling or History Dependent?

Gareth Davies and David Vines

No 1239, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: The viability of a fixed exchange rate system is shown to be state- or shock-dependent. We show, simply, Obstfeld's claim that there may be multiple equilibria - multiple shock values for which a regime switch becomes optimal. We distinguish between self-fulfilling and history-dependent crises. In the former, crises may occur due to a jump from one equilibrium to another, even for constant model parameters, including the government's cost of quitting the regime. In the latter, costly expectational adjustment implies that the country's history, embodied in its initial expectations, determines the relevant equilibrium and the likelihood of a crisis.

Keywords: Currency Crises; Fixed Exchange Rates; Hysteresis; Self-Fulfilling; State-Dependence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F31 F33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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