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The Survival and Demise of the State: A Dynamic Theory of Secessions

Joan Esteban (), Sabine Flamand (), Massimo Morelli and Dominic Rohner ()

No 12398, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper describes the repeated interaction between groups in a country as a repeated Stackelberg bargaining game, where conflict and secessions can happen on the equilibrium path due to commitment problems. If a group out of power is sufficiently small and their contribution to total surplus is not too large, then the group in power can always maintain peace with an agreeable surplus sharing offer every period. When there is a mismatch between relative size and relative surplus contribution of the minority group, conflict can occur. While in the static model secession can occur only as peaceful outcome, in the infinite horizon game with high discount factor conflict followed by secession can occur. We discuss our full characterization of equilibrium outcomes in light of the available empirical evidence.

Keywords: conflict; Dynamic Game; Secession; Separatism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D74 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-mic
Date: 2017-10
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Working Paper: The Survival and Demise of the State: A Dynamic Theory of Secession (2018) Downloads
Working Paper: The Survival and Demise of the State: A Dynamic Theory of Secession (2017) Downloads
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