 A Model of Focusing in Political ChoiceSalvatore Nunnari and Jan Zapal No 12407, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research Abstract: This paper develops a model of voters’ and politicians’ behavior based on the notion that voters focus disproportionately on and, hence, overweigh the policies in which politicians’ platforms differ more. We introduce focusing in a model of electoral competition between differentiated candidates who invest resources to improve the quality of their policies in multiple common value issues. We show that voters’ attention distortion leads to greater investment in policy development, greater platform differentiation (with politicians standing out in the policies they are more competent in), and greater investment in divisive policies. Finally, we show that focusing can contribute to explain puzzling stylized facts such as the entry of single-issue parties with no electoral chances or the inverse correlation between income inequality and redistribution. JEL-codes: D30 D72 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12407 Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from Access Statistics for this paper More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK. |
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