Public goods and Future Audiences

Giuseppe Attanasi, Dessí, Roberta, Frederic Moisan () and Donald Robertson
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Roberta Dessi

No 12413, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Individuals' decisions to behave prosocially (or the contrary) can often be observed by other individuals, with no direct connection to them, but who may nevertheless be influenced by them (e.g. through social media). Does knowing that they may be viewed as role models by other, notably younger, people affect the way individuals behave? Does it make them more likely to behave prosocially? We study how participants' behavior in an experimental public good game is affected when they know that information about their choices and outcomes, together with different sets of information about their identity, will be transmitted the following year to a set of new, unknown, first-year students at the same university. When subjects know their photo, choices and outcomes will be transmitted, they contribute significantly less. We consider different possible explanations, and show that the most convincing is based on image concerns: subjects in the photo treatment care about being perceived as smart and successful by future students.

Keywords: Image; concerns (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-age, nep-dem, nep-exp and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Public goods and future audiences (2024)
Working Paper: Public goods and future audiences (2024)
Working Paper: Public goods and future audiences (2023)
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