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Regulatory Reform: A Scorecard

Stephen Cecchetti () and Kermit Schoenholtz

No 12465, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: The financial crisis of 2007-09 revealed many deficiencies in the financial system. In response, authorities have implemented a wide range of regulatory reforms. We survey the reforms and offer our views on where there could be further improvements. While capital requirements and levels are far higher, they are not high enough. New liquidity requirements are useful, but need simplification. Shifting derivatives transactions to central counterparties has improved resilience, but also created indispensable financial market utilities that lack credible resolution and recovery regimes. And systemic (macroprudential) regulation lacks the metrics, policy tools, governance structure, and international cooperation needed to be effective.

Keywords: Capital requirements; Central clearing; financial regulation; liquidity requirements; macro-financial linkages; macroprudential policy; Prudential regulation; recovery and resolution planing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E58 G01 G18 G28 G38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cba, nep-ict and nep-mac
Date: 2017-11
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