How well targeted are soda taxes?

Pierre Dubois, Rachel Griffith and Martin O'Connell

No 12484, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Soda taxes aim to reduce excessive sugar consumption. Their effectiveness depends on whether they target individuals for whom the harm of consumption is largest. We study individual level purchases made on-the-go. We estimate demand and account for supply-side equilibrium pass-through. We exploit longitudinal data to estimate individual preferences, which allows flexible heterogeneity that we relate to key individual characteristics. We show that soda taxes are relatively effective at targeting young and poor consumers but not individuals with high total dietary sugar; they are unlikely to be strongly regressive especially if we account for averted future costs from over consumption.

Keywords: Preference heterogeneity; Discrete choice demand; Pass-through; Soda tax (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D12 H31 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr and nep-hea
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Related works:
Journal Article: How Well Targeted Are Soda Taxes? (2020)
Working Paper: How well targeted are soda taxes? (2020)
Working Paper: How well targeted are soda taxes? (2020)
Working Paper: How well targeted are soda taxes? (2020)
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