Skin-in-the-Game in ABS Transactions: A Critical Review of Policy Options

Jan Krahnen () and Christian Wilde

No 12619, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: In response to the financial crisis, as a way to align incentives of originators and investors, new regulation in the US (Dodd-Frank) and the EU (CRR) requires issuers of asset backed securities to hold some skin-in-the-game, offering a set of options for risk retention. We propose an intuitive metric exposing effective risk retention and demonstrate that it varies widely across the available retention options. Requiring open disclosure of the metric, rather than demanding choice among arbitrarily specified and dissimilar retention options, would allow markets to price retention properly, and issuers to choose their desired retention level freely.

Keywords: Structured finance; Abs; Securitization; Dodd-frank act; Impact assessment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Skin-in-the-game in ABS transactions: A critical review of policy options (2017)
Working Paper: Skin in the game in ABS transactions: A critical review of policy options (2017)
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