EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Talent Development and Labour Market Integration: The Case of EU Football

Pehr-Johan Norbäck (), Martin Olsson () and Lars Persson

No 12702, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We analyse how the Bosman ruling changed the incentives for football clubs in the European Union (EU) to develop talents. We show that the stiffer bidding competition over star players after the Bosman ruling has spurred talent development primarily in EU countries without established top clubs. This, in turn, has had a positive impact on their junior and senior national teams' performance. However, the stiffer bidding competition has also led to a lower competitive balance in the Champions League, as non-established clubs prefer to sell their star players instead of challenging the top clubs. We provide empirical evidence consistent with these findings.

Keywords: Bosman ruling; Champions League; Sports industry; star players (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J44 L50 L83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur and nep-spo
Date: 2018-02
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=12702 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
Working Paper: Talent Development and Labour Market Integration: The Case of EU Football (2018) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12702

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.cepr.org/ ... rs/dp.php?dpno=12702

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().

 
Page updated 2019-12-06
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12702