EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Communication in Context: Interpreting Promises in an Experiment on Competition and Trust

Alessandra Casella (), Navin Kartik, Luis Sanchez and Sébastien Turban

No 12709, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: How much do people lie, and how much do people trust communication when lying is possible? An important step towards answering these questions is understanding how communication is interpreted. This paper establishes in a canonical experiment that competition can alter the shared communication code: the commonly understood meaning of messages. We study a Sender-Receiver game in which the Sender dictates how to share $10 with the Receiver, if the Receiver participates. The Receiver has an outside option and decides whether to participate after receiving a non-binding offer from the Sender. Competition for play between Senders leads to higher offers but has no effect on actual transfers, expected transfers, or Receivers' willingness to play. The higher offers signal that sharing will be equitable without the expectation that they should be followed literally: under competition "6 is the new 5".

Keywords: Bargaining; cheap talk; Dictator Game; Guilt-aversion; Lying; trust game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 D64 D83 D9 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-soc
Date: 2018-02
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=12709 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12709

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.cepr.org/ ... rs/dp.php?dpno=12709

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().

 
Page updated 2019-08-20
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12709