Horizontal Mergers and Product Innovation

Tommaso Valletti, Gregor Langus and Giulio Federico

No 12759, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We set up a stylized oligopoly model of uncertain product innovation to analyze the effects of a merger on innovation incentives and on consumer surplus. The model incorporates two competitive channels for merger effects: the "price coordination" channel and the internalization of the "innovation externality". We solve the model numerically and find that price coordination between the two products of the merged firm tends to stimulate innovation, while internalization of the innovation externality depresses it. The latter effect is stronger in our simulations and, as a result, the merger leads to lower innovation incentives for the merged entity, absent cost efficiencies and knowledge spillovers. In our numerical analysis both overall innovation and consumer welfare fall after a merger.

Keywords: Innovation; R&d; Mergers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 G34 L40 O30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp, nep-com, nep-ino and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (82)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP12759 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Horizontal mergers and product innovation (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12759

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP12759

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().