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The Economics of Supranational Bank Supervision

Thorsten Beck (), Consuelo Silva-Buston and Wolf Wagner ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Consuelo Silva Buston

No 12764, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We document large variation in the propensity and the intensity in which countries cooperate in the supervision of banks. We show that these variations can be linked to differences in cooperation gains. Using hand-collected data on supranational agreements for 4,278 country pairs during the period 1995-2013, we find that proxies for bilateral cooperation gains a) increase the likelihood of cooperation, b) accelerate the adoption of cooperation, c) make intense forms of cooperation more likely. An analysis of regional cooperation shows that their make-up, as well as their evolution, is broadly consistent with predicted cooperation gains. Our findings suggests that a uniform approach to supranational supervision is not necessarily desirable as countries differ considerably in the extent to which theybenefit from cooperation.

Keywords: cross-border banking; externalities; Supranational supervisory cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G1 G2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban
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