The Economics of Supranational Bank Supervision

Thorsten Beck, Wolf Wagner () and Consuelo Silva-Buston
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Consuelo Silva Buston

No 12764, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We document large variation in the propensity and the intensity in which countries cooperate in the supervision of banks. We show that these variations can be linked to differences in cooperation gains. Using hand-collected data on supranational agreements for 4,278 country pairs during the period 1995-2013, we find that proxies for bilateral cooperation gains a) increase the likelihood of cooperation, b) accelerate the adoption of cooperation, c) make intense forms of cooperation more likely. An analysis of regional cooperation shows that their make-up, as well as their evolution, is broadly consistent with predicted cooperation gains. Our findings suggests that a uniform approach to supranational supervision is not necessarily desirable as countries diff er considerably in the extent to which they bene fit from cooperation.

Keywords: Supranational supervisory cooperation; Cross-border banking; Externalities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G1 G2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Journal Article: The Economics of Supranational Bank Supervision (2023)
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