Bank Resolution and the Structure of Global Banks
Patrick Bolton and
No 13032, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
We study the resolution of global banks by national regulators. Single-point-of-entry (SPOE) resolution, where loss-absorbing capital is shared across jurisdictions, isefficient but may not be implementable. First, when expected transfers across jurisdictions are too asymmetric, national regulators fail to set up SPOE resolution ex ante. Second, when required ex-post transfers are too large, national regulators ring-fence assets instead of cooperating in SPOE resolution. In this case, a multiple-point-of-entry (MPOE) resolution, where loss-absorbing capital is pre-assigned, is more robust. Our analysis highlights a fundamental link between efficient bank resolution and the operational structures and risks of global banks.
Keywords: bank resolution; single point of entry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G01 G18 G21 G33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban and nep-ifn
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