EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Do Elected Councils Improve Governance? Experimental Evidence on Local Institutions in Afghanistan

Ruben Enikolopov

No 13053, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Using data from a field experiment across 500 villages in Afghanistan, we study how electoral accountability of local institutions affects the quality of governance. In villages with newly created elected councils, food aid distributed by local leaders is more likely to reach needy villagers. However, this effect is observed only if the council is mandated to be the entity responsible for managing the distribution. In the absence of such a mandate the presence of elected councils increases embezzlement without improving aid targeting. Thus, while elected councils can improve governance, unclear and overlapping mandates may increase rent-seeking and worsen governance outcomes.

Keywords: democratization; field experiment; governance quality; Political Institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 O1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-pol and nep-ure
Date: 2018-07
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=13053 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
Working Paper: Do elected councils improve governance ? experimental evidence on local institutions in Afghanistan (2013) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13053

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.cepr.org/ ... rs/dp.php?dpno=13053

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().

 
Page updated 2019-09-18
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13053