Media Freedom in the Shadow of a Coup
Mehdi Shadmehr and
Konstantin Sonin ()
No 13189, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Popular protests and palace coups are the two domestic threats to dictators. We show that free media, which informs citizens about their rulers, is a double-edged sword that alleviates one threat, but exacerbates the other. Informed citizens may protest against a ruler, but they may also protest to restore him after a palace coup. In choosing media freedom, the leader trades off these conflicting effects. We develop a model in which citizens engage in a regime change global game, and media freedom is a ruler's instrument for Bayesian persuasion, used to manage the competing risks of coups and protests. A coup switches the status quo from being in the ruler's favor to being against him. This introduces convexities in the ruler's Bayesian persuasion problem, causing him to benefi t from an informed citizenry. Rulers tolerate freer press when citizens are pessimistic about them, or coups signal information about them to citizens.
Keywords: authoritarian politics; Bayesian persuasion; coup; global games; media freedom; protest; signaling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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