The WTO Government Procurement Agreement as a Commitment Device: A First Appraisal
Benedikt Dengler
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Bernard Hoekman
No 13266, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Abstract:
This paper presents novel reduced form evidence on the association between international trade agreements that include disciplines on public procurement practices reflected in the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) and preferential trade agreements (PTAs) and public sector imports following the 2008 financial crisis. The results are suggestive of such international disciplines acting as an effective commitment device: GPA membership is associated with a significantly higher import share following the crisis than is observed for countries that are not members. We also find evidence that the GPA and PTAs that cover public procurement are partial substitutes.
Keywords: Trade agreements; Commitment; Public procurement; Wto; Government procurement agreement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 F15 H57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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