EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

International Migration Intentions and Illegal Costs: Evidence Using Africa-to-Europe Smuggling Routes

Guido Friebel (), Miriam Manchin (), Mariapia Mendola () and Giovanni Prarolo ()

No 13326, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Irregular migrants from Africa and the Middle East flow into Europe along land and sea routes under the control of human smugglers. The demise of the Gaddafi regime in 2011 marked the opening of the Central Mediterranean Route for irregular border crossing between Libya and Italy. This resulted in the immediate expansion of the global smuggling network, which produced an asymmetric reduction in bilateral distance between country pairs across the Mediterranean sea. We exploit this source of spatial and time variation in irregular migration routes to estimate the elasticity of migration intentions to illegal moving costs proxied by distance. We build a novel dataset of geolocalized time-varying migration routes, combined with cross-country survey data on individual intentions to move from Africa (and the Middle East) into Europe. Netting out any country-by-time and pair-level confounders we find a large negative effect of distance along smuggling routes on individual migration intentions. Shorter distances increase the willingness to migrate especially for youth, (medium) skilled individuals and those with a network abroad. The effect is stronger in countries closer to Libya and with weak rule of law.

Keywords: Human Smuggling; illegal migration; International Migration; Libyan Civil War (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K23 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int, nep-law and nep-mig
Date: 2018-11
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=13326 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13326

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.cepr.org/ ... rs/dp.php?dpno=13326

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().

 
Page updated 2019-10-16
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13326