Minority share acquisitions and collusion: evidence from the introduction of national leniency programs
Ulrich Laitenberger and
No 13327, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
There is a growing concern that minority shareholding (MS) in rival firms may facilitate collusion. To examine this concern, we exploit the fact that leniency programs (LPs) are generally recognized as a shock that destabilizes collusive agreements and study the effect that the introduction of an LP has on horizontal MS acquisitions. Using data from 63 countries over the period 1990-2013, we find a large increase in horizontal MS acquisitions in the year in which an LP is introduced, especially in large rivals. The effect is present however only in countries with an effective antitrust enforcement and low levels of corruption and only when the acquisitions involve stakes of 10% - 20%. These results suggest that MS acquisitions may stabilize collusive agreements that were destabilized by the introduction of the LP.
Keywords: cartel stability; Collusion; Leniency Programs; minority shareholdings (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G34 K21 L4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cfn, nep-com, nep-ind and nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at email@example.com
Working Paper: Minority Share Acquisitions and Collusion: Evidence from the Introduction of National Leniency Programs (2017)
Working Paper: Minority share acquisitions and collusion: Evidence from the introduction of national leniency programs (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13327
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.cepr.org/ ... rs/dp.php?dpno=13327
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().