Market Structure and Competition in Airline Markets
Federico Ciliberto (),
Charles Murry () and
No 13346, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
We provide an econometric framework for estimating a game of simultaneous entry and pricing decisions in oligopolistic markets while allowing for correlations between unobserved fixed costs, marginal costs, and demand shocks. Firms' decisions to enter a market are based on whether they will realize positive profits from entry. We use our framework to quantitatively account for this selection problem in the pricing stage. We estimate this model using cross-sectional data from the US airline industry. We find that not accounting for endogenous entry leads to overestimation of demand elasticities. This, in turn, leads to biased markups, which has implications for the policy evaluation of market power. Our methodology allows us to study how firms optimally decide entry/exit decision in response to a change in policy. We simulate a merger between American and US Airways and we find that the post-merger market structure and prices depend crucially on how we model the characteristics of the post-merger firm as a function of the pre-merger firms' characteristics. Overall, the merged firm has a strong incentive to enter new markets; the merged firm faces a stronger threat of entry from rival legacy carriers, as opposed to low cost carriers; and, post-merger entry mitigates the adverse effects of increased concentration.
Keywords: Entry; market power; market structure; merger; multiple equilibria; oligopoly; Self-selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C35 C51 D43 L13 L41 L44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-ind and nep-reg
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