Optimal Healthcare Contracts: Theory and Empirical Evidence from Italy
Gianni De Fraja () and
No 13357, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
In this paper we investigate the nature of the contracts between a large health-care purchaser and health service providers in a prospective payment system. We model theoretically the interaction between patients choice and cream-skimming by hospitals. We test the model using a very large and detailed administrative dataset for the largest region in Italy. In line with our theoretical results, we show that the state funded purchaser offers providers a system of incentives such that the most efficient providers both treat more patients and also treat more difficult patients, thus receiving a higher average payment per treatment.
Keywords: Cream skimming; Hospitals; Lombardy; Optimal healthcare contracts; Patients choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 H42 I11 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at firstname.lastname@example.org
Working Paper: Optimal Healthcare Contracts:Theory and Empirical Evidence from Italy (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13357
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.cepr.org/ ... rs/dp.php?dpno=13357
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().