Strategic Fertility, Education Choices, and Conflicts in Deeply Divided Societies

David de la Croix, Emeline Bezin and ,
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Bastien Chabé-Ferret ()

No 13412, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Fertility becomes a strategic choice when having a larger population helps to gain power. Minority groups might find it optimal to promote high fertility among their members - this is known as the "weapon of the womb" argument. If, in addition, parents have to invest resources to educate their children, a higher fertility for strategic motives might reduce their investment. Indonesian census data dispel this view, as minority religious groups do not invest less in education. If anything, they invest more in education, as well as in their number of children. This finding is consistent with human capital being an input to appropriation. Solving for the Nash equilibrium of a game between two groups with two strategic variables, we derive the condition under which the minority group displays a higher investment in both the quantity and quality of children. The material cost of conflict involved through the weapon of the womb mechanism is mitigated when human capital enters the contest function.

Keywords: Fertility; Quality-quantity trade-off; Minorities; Conflict; Population engineering; Human capital; Nash equilibrium; Indonesia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 J13 J15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dem, nep-gth and nep-sea
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Related works:
Working Paper: Strategic Fertility, Education Choices, and Conflicts in Deeply Divided Societies (2025)
Working Paper: Strategic Fertility, Education Choices, and Conflicts in Deeply Divided Societies (2025)
Working Paper: Strategic Fertility, Education Choices and Conflicts in Deeply Divided Societies (2018)
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