Markets for Financial Innovation
Ana Babus and
Kinda Hachem
No 13457, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Abstract:
We propose a model where both security design and market structure are endogenously determined to explain why standardized securities are frequently traded in decentralized markets. We find that issuers offer debt contracts in thinner markets where investors have a higher price impact, and equity in deeper markets. In turn, investors accept to trade in thinner markets to elicit less variable securities from issuers if gains from trade are small. Otherwise, investors choose to trade in deeper markets where their price impact is minimized. We also show that there exist equilibrium market structures in which both debt and equity are traded.
Keywords: Security design; Market structure; Price impact (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D47 D86 G23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP13457 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org
Related works:
Journal Article: Markets for financial innovation (2023) 
Working Paper: Markets for Financial Innovation (2019) 
Working Paper: Markets for Financial Innovation (2018) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13457
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP13457
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().