Managerial Style and Attention

Wouter Dessein and Tano Santos

No 13527, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Is firm behavior mainly driven by its environment or rather by the characteristics of its managers? We develop a cognitive theory of manager fixed effects, where the allocation of managerial attention determines firm behavior. We show that in complex environments, the endogenous allocation of attention exacerbates manager fixed effects. Small differences in managerial expertise then may result in dramatically different firm behavior, as managers devote scarce attention in a way which amplifies initial differences. In contrast, in less complex environments, the endogenous allocation of attention mitigates manager fixed effects. Firm owners prefer `managers with style' only in complex environments.

Keywords: Managerial style; Attention; Firm strategy; Firm behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ent
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