Blood Donations and Incentives: Evidence from a Field Experiment

Lorenz Goette and Alois Stutzer

No 13677, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: There is a longstanding concern that material incentives might undermine pro-social motivation, leading to a decrease in blood donations rather than an increase. This paper provides an empirical test of how material incentives affect blood donations in a large-scale field experiment spanning three months and involving more than 10,000 previous donors. We examine two types of rewards: a lottery ticket and a free cholesterol test. Lottery tickets significantly increase donations during the experiment, in particular among less motivated donors. Moreover, no reduction in donations is observed after the experiment. The free cholesterol test leads to no discernable impact on blood donations during and after the experiment.

Keywords: Blood donations; Field experiment; Material incentives; Motivation crowding effect; Pro-social behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D64 H41 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-exp, nep-hrm and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP13677 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Blood donations and incentives: Evidence from a field experiment (2020)
Working Paper: Blood Donations and Incentives: Evidence from a Field Experiment (2019)
Working Paper: Blood donations and incentives: evidence from a field experiment (2008)
Working Paper: Blood donations and incentives: evidence from a field experiment (2008)
Working Paper: Blood Donations and Incentives: Evidence from a Field Experiment (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13677

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP13677

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().