Unhedgeable Inflation Risk within Pension Schemes
Damiaan Chen and
Sweder van Wijnbergen ()
No 13742, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Pension schemes generally aim to protect the purchasing power of their participants, but cannot completely do this when due to market incompleteness inflation risk cannot be fully hedged. Without a market price for inflation risk the value of a pension contract depends on the investor's risk appetite and inflation risk exposure. We develop a valuation framework to deal with two sources of unhedgeable inflation risk: the absence of instruments to hedge general consumer price inflation risk and differences in group-specific consumption bundles from the economy-wide bundle. We find that the absence of financial instruments to hedge inflation risks may reduce lifetime welfare by up to 6% of certainty-equivalent consumption for commonly assumed degrees of risk aversion. Regulators face a dilemma as young (workers) and old participants (retirees) have different capacities to absorb losses from unhedgeable inflation risks and as a consequence have a different risk appetite.
Keywords: incomplete markets; pension contract; Unhedgeable inflation risk; Valuation; welfare loss (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 E21 G11 G23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-age, nep-mac, nep-rmg and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at firstname.lastname@example.org
Journal Article: Unhedgeable inflation risk within pension schemes (2020)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13742
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.cepr.org/ ... rs/dp.php?dpno=13742
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().