Empirical evidence on repeated sequential games

Sigrid Suetens and Riccardo Ghidoni

No 13809, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Sequentiality of moves in an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma does not change the conditions under which mutual cooperation can be supported in equilibrium as compared to simultaneous decision-making. The nature of the interaction is different, however, given that the second mover in a sequential-move game does not face strategic uncertainty. We study in an experiment whether sequentiality has an effect on cooperation rates. We find that with intermediate incentives to cooperate, sequentiality increases cooperation rates by around 40 percentage points, whereas with very low or high incentives to cooperate, cooperation rates are respectively very low or high in both settings.

Keywords: Cooperation; Infinitely repeated game; Sequential prisoner's dilemma; Strategic uncertainty; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C90 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Related works:
Working Paper: Empirical Evidence on Repeated Sequential Games (2019)
Working Paper: Empirical Evidence on Repeated Sequential Games (2019)
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