Bank Assets, Liquidity and Credit Cycles
Ivan Petrella () and
No 13831, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
We study how bank collateral assets and their pledgeability affect the amplitude of credit cycles. To this end, we develop a tractable model where bankers intermediate funds between savers and borrowers. If bankers default, savers acquire the right to liquidate bankers' assets. However, due to the vertically integrated structure of our credit economy, savers anticipate that liquidating financial assets (i.e., loans) is conditional on borrowers being solvent on their debt obligations. This friction limits the collateralization of bankers' financial assets beyond that of real assets (i.e., capital). In this context, increasing the pledgeability of financial assets eases more credit and reduces the spread between the loan and the deposit rate, thus attenuating capital misallocation as it typically emerges in credit economies Ã la Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). We uncover a close connection between the collateralization of bank loans, macroeconomic amplification and the degree of procyclicality of bank leverage.
Keywords: Bank Collateral; Banking; capital misallocation; liquidity; macroprudential policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E32 E44 G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cba, nep-dge and nep-mac
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Journal Article: Bank assets, liquidity and credit cycles (2019)
Working Paper: Bank Assets, Liquidity and Credit Cycles (2019)
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