The Social Costs of Side Trading

Thomas Mariotti, Andrea Attar and Salanié, François
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: François Salanié

No 13872, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We study resource allocation under private information when the planner cannot prevent bilateral side trading between consumers and firms. Adverse selection and side trading severely restrict feasible trades: each marginal quantity must be fairly priced given the consumer types who purchase it. The resulting social costs are twofold. First, second-best efficiency and robustness to side trading are in general irreconcilable requirements. Second, there actually exists a unique budget-feasible allocation robust to side trading, which deprives the planner from any capacity to redistribute resources between different types of consumers. We discuss the relevance of our results for insurance and financial markets.

Keywords: Adverse selection; Side trading; Second-best allocations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 D82 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ias and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Social Costs of Side Trading (2020)
Working Paper: The social costs of side trading (2020)
Working Paper: The Social Costs of Side Trading (2020)
Working Paper: The Social Costs of Side Trading (2019)
Working Paper: The Social Costs of Side Trading (2019)
Working Paper: The Social Costs of Side Trading (2019)
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