EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

The "New" Economics of Trade Agreements: From Trade Liberalization to Regulatory Convergence?

Gene M. Grossman, Phillip McCalman and Robert Staiger ()

No 13903, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: What incentives do governments have to negotiate "new trade agreements," i.e., agreements that constrain not only governments' choices of tariffs, but also their domestic regulatory policies? We focus on horizontal product standards, i.e., those that impose requirements along a horizontal dimension of product differentiation. We introduce differences in ideal products across countries and consider cases in which product choices do not and do confer externalities on other national consumers. In addition to characterizing the features of the optimal new trade agreement in each environment, we ask whether detailed negotiations about regulatory rules are needed for global efficiency or whether an "old trade agreement" augmented by some "policed decentralization" of regulatory procedures can achieve the same outcomes.

Keywords: firm delocation; harmonization; international trade agreements; regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 F15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int
Date: 2019-08
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=13903 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
Working Paper: The "New" Economics of Trade Agreements: From Trade Liberalization to Regulatory Convergence? (2019) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13903

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.cepr.org/ ... rs/dp.php?dpno=13903

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().

 
Page updated 2020-01-02
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13903