The "New" Economics of Trade Agreements: From Trade Liberalization to Regulatory Convergence?

Gene Grossman, Phillip McCalman and Robert Staiger

No 13903, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: What incentives do governments have to negotiate "new trade agreements," i.e., agreements that constrain not only governments' choices of tariffs, but also their domestic regulatory policies? We focus on horizontal product standards, i.e., those that impose requirements along a horizontal dimension of product differentiation. We introduce differences in ideal products across countries and consider cases in which product choices do not and do confer externalities on other national consumers. In addition to characterizing the features of the optimal new trade agreement in each environment, we ask whether detailed negotiations about regulatory rules are needed for global efficiency or whether an "old trade agreement" augmented by some "policed decentralization" of regulatory procedures can achieve the same outcomes.

Keywords: International trade agreements; Regulation; Harmonization; Firm delocation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 F15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The “New” Economics of Trade Agreements: From Trade Liberalization to Regulatory Convergence? (2021)
Working Paper: The "New" Economics of Trade Agreements: From Trade Liberalization to Regulatory Convergence? (2019)
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