Task Discretion, Labor Market Frictions and Entrepreneurship
Andrea Canidio
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Patrick Legros
No 13954, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Abstract:
Each job can be performed in several ways, which we call tasks An agent's performance at a task is informative about his productivity at different tasks. But tasks are not contractible: choosing tasks is the prerogative of management within firms, and of the agent if he is an entrepreneur. Firms will invest in the discovery of their workers' productivity at different tasks only if they cannot easily move to other firms. Therefore, labor-market frictions determine whether learning an agent's talent occur within firms, or whether an agent may become an entrepreneur to acquire task discretion.
Keywords: Task discretion; Organizational choice; entrepreneurship; Labor-market frictions; Entrepreneurial failures; Learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 J24 J62 J63 L26 M13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-ent, nep-hrm, nep-lma and nep-sbm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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