Heterogeneity in Decentralized Asset Markets

Julien Hugonnier, Benjamin Lester and Pierre-Olivier Weill

No 14014, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We study a search and bargaining model of asset markets in which investors’ heterogeneous valuations for the asset are drawn from an arbitrary distribution. We present a solution technique that makes the model fully tractable, and allows us to provide a complete characterization of the unique equilibrium, in closed-form, both in and out of steady-state. Using this characterization, we derive several novel implications that highlight the important of heterogeneity. In particular, we show how some investors endogenously emerge as intermediaries, even though they have no advantage in contacting other agents or holding inventory; and we show how heterogeneity magnifies the impact of search frictions on asset prices, misallocation, and welfare.

Keywords: Search frictions; Bargaining; Heterogeneity; Price dispersion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G11 G12 G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-09
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Related works:
Journal Article: Heterogeneity in decentralized asset markets (2022)
Working Paper: Heterogeneity in Decentralized Asset Markets (2020)
Working Paper: Heterogeneity in Decentralized Asset Markets (2019)
Working Paper: Heterogeneity in decentralized asset markets (2016)
Working Paper: Heterogeneity in decentralized asset markets (2015)
Working Paper: Heterogeneity in Decentralized Asset Markets (2014)
Working Paper: Heterogeneity in Decentralized Asset Markets (2014)
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