Are political and economic integration intertwined?

Tommaso Frattini, Bernt Bratsberg (), Giovanni Facchini and Anna Rosso

No 14041, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Economic incentives play a key role in the decision to run for office, but little is known on how they shape immigrants' selection into candidacy. We study this question using a two-period Roy model and show that if returns to labour market experience are higher for migrants than natives, migrants will be less likely to seek office than natives. We empirically assess this prediction using administrative data from Norway, a country with a very liberal regime for participation in local elections. Our results strongly support our theoretical model and indicate that immigrants' political and economic integration are closely intertwined.

Keywords: Immigration; Local elections; Candidacy decision; Labour markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F22 J45 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lma
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Are political and economic integration intertwined? (2023)
Working Paper: Are Political and Economic Integration Intertwined? (2019)
Working Paper: Are Political and Economic Integration Interwinded? (2019)
Working Paper: Are Political and Economic Integration Intertwined? (2019)
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