Electoral Sentencing Cycles
Roberto Galbiati,
David Abrams () and
Arnaud Philippe
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Emeric Henry
No 14049, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Abstract:
Exploiting features of the North-Carolina judicial system, elections and forced rotation of judges, we overcome major challenges hampering the identifi cation of the existence and source of sentencing variation over the electoral cycle. We show that when elections approach, sentencing for felonies increase. This increase is driven by decisions taken by judges present in their district of election, and only when elections are contested. When judges operate outside their district of elections, sentencing decisions do not signi ficantly vary over the electoral cycle. Our results demonstrate the existence of strategic sentencing by judges in an attempt to please voters and allow us to discard alternative explanations for the rise along the cycle, such as behavioral motives or contextual explanations.
JEL-codes: K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-law and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
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Related works:
Journal Article: Electoral Sentencing Cycles (2023) 
Working Paper: Electoral Sentencing Cycles (2023) 
Working Paper: Electoral Sentencing Cycles (2023) 
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