Greek Closed-End Fund Premia: Differences and Similarities with US Premia and Their Implications

Gikas Hardouvelis () and Emmanuel Tsiritakis

No 1406, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: The prices of Greek closed-end funds behave similarly to the prices of US funds: they deviate substantially from their net asset values (NAVs); they are more volatile than their NAVs; and they are overly-sensitive to the movements of the domestic stock market index. Furthermore, their premia are: (i) positively correlated cross-sectionally; (ii) positively correlated with the future NAV returns; and (iii) negatively correlated with the future returns on the funds. Yet most Greek funds are subsidiaries of banks that have considerable influence on their pricing, whereas US funds are owned mainly by small investors. Future explanations to the closed-end fund puzzle should, therefore, transcend the narrow institutional characteristics of asset composition and ownership of US closed-end funds.

Keywords: Arbitrage; Bank Subsidiary; Closed-End Fund; Common Factor; Excess Volatility; Fund Discount; Fund Premium; Market Friction; Mean Reversion; Measurement Error; Net Asset Value; Noise Trading; Over-senstivity; Predictive Ability; Small Investor (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G14 G15 G23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996-05
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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