Public Procurement: A Post-Uruguay Round Perspective
Joseph Francois,
Douglas Nelson and
David Palmeter
No 1412, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Abstract:
This paper reviews the implications of the Uruguay Round Government Procurement Agreement, both for current practice in the United States and for general conditions of market access in other major markets. We emphasize the relative importance of government purchases within given markets. Because of the concentrated nature of US procurement patterns, the potential impact of preferences on overall conditions of market access is relatively limited. For those sectors we flag as important in terms of procurement practices, it is likely that future liberalization will have to involve both the expansion of the Procurement Agreement and of the relevant commitments under the General Agreement on Trade in Services.
Keywords: Government Procurement; Trade Liberalization; Uruguay Round (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996-06
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)
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