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African institutions under colonial rule

Jutta Bolt and Leigh Gardner

No 14198, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Colonial institutions in Africa are the subject of a substantial literature, but it neglects the local institutions which governed Africans in rural areas. This paper uses new data on local African governments, or “Native Authorities†in British Africa to present the first quantitative comparison of African institutions under indirect rule in the late colonial period. Using tax revenue as a measure of state capacity, the data show that the structure and capacity of Native Authorities varied between and within colonies, based not only on underlying economic inequalities but also on the relationships between African elites and colonial governments.

Keywords: Colonialism; Institutions; Africa (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: N47 N97 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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