The Role of Market Size in the Formation of Jurisdictions

Alessandra Casella

No 1429, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Administrative and political reorganization is being actively debated even in the mature, stable economies of Western Europe. This paper investigates the possibility of such reorganization being tied to the integration of economic markets. The paper describes the equilibrium of a game where heterogeneous individuals form coalitions for the provision of a public good, and where the number and composition of these coalitions depend on the overall size of the market. Changes in the extent of the market put pressure on existing jurisdictions because they change both the desired public goods and, more importantly, the trade-offs that determine the borders of the jurisdictions. Thus individuals will want to renegotiate the agreements that support the existing jurisdictions and form alternative coalitions.

Keywords: Coalition Formation; Economic Integration; Market Size; Strong Nash Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F15 H41 R12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996-06
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=1429 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The Role of Market Size in the Formation of Jurisdictions (2001)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:1429

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.cepr.org/ ... ers/dp.php?dpno=1429

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().