Corporate Yields and Sovereign Yields

Galina Hale, Julia Bevilaqua and Eric Tallman

No 14344, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We document that positive association between corporate and sovereign cost of funds borrowed on global capital markets weakens during periods of unusually high sovereign yields, when some corporate borrowers are able to issue debt that is priced at lower rates than sovereign debt. This state-dependent sensitivity of corporate yields to sovereign yields has not been previously documented in the literature. We demonstrate that this stylized fact is observed across countries and industries as well as for a given borrower over time. It is not explained by a different composition of borrowers issuing debt during periods of high sovereign yields, by the relationship between corporate and sovereign credit ratings, and only partially explained by financial crises and IMF programs. We propose a simple information model that rationalizes our empirical observations: when sovereign yields are high, corporate yields are less sensitive to sovereign yields

Keywords: Bond; Debt; Crisis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E52 F34 F36 F65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Corporate yields and sovereign yields (2020)
Chapter: Corporate Yields and Sovereign Yields (2019)
Working Paper: Corporate Yields and Sovereign Yields (2019)
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