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Global Imbalances and Policy Wars at the Zero Lower Bound

Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, Emmanuel Farhi and Ricardo Caballero ()

No 14424, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This paper explores the consequences of extremely low real interest rates in a world with integrated but heterogenous capital markets, nominal rigidities and an effective lower bound (a ZLB for simplicity). We establish four main results: (i) At the ZLB, creditor countries export their recession abroad, which we illustrate with a new Metzler diagram in quantities; (ii) Beggar-thy-neighbor currency and trade wars provide stimulus to the undertaking country at the expense of other countries; (iii) (Safe) public debt issuances and increases in government spending anywhere are expansionary everywhere; (iv) When there is a scarcity of safe assets, net issuers of safe assets import the recession from abroad.

JEL-codes: E0 F3 F4 G1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ifn, nep-mac and nep-opm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Global Imbalances and Policy Wars at the Zero Lower Bound (2021) Downloads
Working Paper: Global Imbalances and Policy Wars at the Zero Lower Bound (2015) Downloads
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