How Do Taxpayers Respond to Public Disclosure and Social Recognition Programs? Evidence from Pakistan

Mazhar Waseem, Joel Slemrod and Obeid Ur Rehman

No 14463, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We examine two Pakistani programs to see if the public disclosure of tax information and social recognition of top taxpayers promote tax compliance. Pakistan began revealing income tax paid by every taxpayer in the country from 2012. Simultaneously, another program began recognizing and rewarding the top 100 tax paying corporations, partnerships, self-employed individuals, and wage-earners. We find that both programs induced strong compliance responses. The public disclosure caused on average a 9 log-points increase in the tax paid by individuals exposed to the program. The increase was even larger for the social recognition program, around 17 log-points. Our results suggest that such programs can be important policy levers to mobilize resources, especially in weak-enforcement-capacity economies.

Keywords: Tax; evasion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-iue and nep-pbe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: How Do Taxpayers Respond to Public Disclosure and Social Recognition Programs? Evidence from Pakistan (2022)
Working Paper: How do Taxpayers Respond to Public Disclosure and Social Recognition Programs? Evidence from Pakistan (2020)
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