Investor-State vs. State-State Dispute Settlement

Henrik Horn and Tangerås, Thomas
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Thomas Tangerås ()

No 14480, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: International investment agreements have been intensely criticized, and in particular the “ISDS” mechanisms that enable foreign investors to litigate against host countries. This paper examines the common claim that host countries benefi…t from state-state dispute settlement (SSDS), since this yields less litigation. It assumes the standard rationale for ISDS, that SSDS causes political litigation costs. It shows how a host country might indeed bene…fit from SSDS, but that there is no presumption that these conditions will prevail. Furthermore, negotiations regarding dispute settlement will plausibly yield ISDS, regardless of the distributional consequences for host countries, since SSDS is Pareto inefficient.

Keywords: Idsd; Expropriation; International investment agreement; Regulatory chill (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F21 F23 F55 K33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int and nep-law
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Investor-State vs. State-State Dispute Settlement (2019)
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