The Prospects of a Mini Currency Union in 1999

Paul De Grauwe

No 1458, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: In this paper we analyse the prospects of a mini currency union in Europe. We argue that the Maastricht strategy will create a situation in which the countries excluded from the EMU will use their negative voting power to bar the entry of a number of core countries into the union. The countries excluded will have a strong legal basis to do so because several core countries will fail one or more Maastricht convergence norms. Thus, the scenario that the financial markets believe in today is highly unrealistic. Instead countries will be confronted with the choice of a maxi currency union or no currency union.

Keywords: Maastricht Treaty; monetary integration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F33 F36 F42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996-09
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=1458 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:1458

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.cepr.org/ ... ers/dp.php?dpno=1458

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().