Assortative Matching Contests

Aner Sela

No 14598, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We study two-sided matching contests with two sets, A and B, each of which includes a finite number of heterogeneous agents with commonly known types. The agents in each set compete in Tullock contests where they simultaneously send their costly efforts, and then are assortatively matched, namely, the winner of set A is matched with the winner of set B and so on until all the agents in the set with the smaller number of agents are matched. We analyze the agents' equilibrium efforts for which an agent's match-value is either a multiplicative or an additive function of the types who are matched. We demonstrate that whether or not both sets have the same number of agents might have a critical effect on their equilibrium efforts. In particular, a little change in the size of one of the sets might have a radical effect on the agents' equilibrium efforts.

Keywords: Two-sided matching; Tullock contest (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D72 D82 J31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: ASSORTATIVE MATCHING CONTESTS (2020)
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