EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Incentivizing Behavioral Change: The Role of Time Preferences

Rebecca Dizon-Ross, Shilpa Aggarwal and Ariel Zucker

No 14751, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: How should the design of incentives vary with agent time preferences? We develop two predictions. First, “bundling†the payment function over time – specifically by making the payment for future effort increase in current effort -- is more effective if individuals are impatient over effort. Second, increasing the frequency of payment is more effective if individuals are impatient over payment. We test the efficacy of time-bundling and payment frequency, and their interactions with impatience, using a randomized evaluation of an incentives program for exercise among diabetics in India. Consistent with our theoretical predictions, bundling payments over time meaningfully increases effort among the impatient relative to the patient. In contrast, increasing payment frequency has limited efficacy, suggesting limited impatience over payments. On average, incentives increase daily steps by 1,266 (13 minutes of brisk walking) and improve health.

Date: 2020-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-hrm and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP14751 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:14751

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP14751

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().

 
Page updated 2023-07-05
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:14751